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TORT, CRIME AND THE PRIMITIVE
GERHARD 0. W. MUELLER
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Switzerland (privatim), England (exchange student, scholarship) 1949. Studied social
sciences and law in the University of Chicago where he won the degree of Doctor of
Law. He served two quarters as assistant, and later associate, in the University, doing
comparative law research. During 1953-4 he was Instructor of Law, in The School of
Law, University of Washington. He served as Huger W. Jervey Fellow of Comparative (Criminal) Law, Columbia University, School of Law (affiliated to Columbia's
Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law) during '54-'55. He has published
articles in professional journals and has monographs in preparation for publication.
He is now Assistant Professor of Law at the West Virginia University.-EmrroR.
At a time when the social and economic development of a nation is rapidly progressing, the lawyers' interests are easily restricted to matters of immediate concern for
the practice. So it is gratifying to note that at just such a time the great books of the
law are being brought into the foreground again. In publishing the Twentieth Century
Legal Philosophy Series the Association of American Law Schools emphasizes the
importance of the classics of law-both for understanding the past and for molding
the future of our legal system. However, it is not easy to "read" these classics. Though
they contain matter of lasting importance, it must be kept in mind that any scholar,
however capable, is handicapped in his work by the amount of general knowledge
available at his time. It is therefore both useful and necessary to re-evaluate the
conclusions which our law classics have drawn, especially with regard to historical
matter. This paper is devoted to a re-evaluation of statements made by Max Weber
with regard to the primitive law of wrongs.' In part one I shall compare modem law
of wrongs with Weber's description of primitive law of wrongs. Part two will be
devoted to a discussion of the primitive law's distinction between crime and tort.
Part three attempts to answer the question whether primitive law of wrongs does
concern itself with the frame of mind, the mens rea, of the wrongdoer. Weber said
"no". There is one fundamental question which appears again and again: Do all
primitive systems of justice show the same or similar features? I have kept this problem in mind while doing my research and I think that this question is fully answered
in the following discussion.
A few words must be said about the sources which were open to Weber and which
I MAX WEBER on LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, edited with introduction and annotations by

Max Rheinstein, Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Translation from MAX WEBER, wIRTscaA'r uND GEsELLsHAPT, Second Edition (1925) by Edward
Shils, Professor of Sociology, Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago, and Max Rheinstein, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press (1954). This work is volume VI of the
20th Century Legal Philosophy Series.
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quite obviously determined his position. Apart from the original sources on early
Germanic, early Roman, and other ancient law of wrongs, in which field our knowledge has not been enlarged by any major new discoveries, Weber seems to have derived his main impetus from Sir Henry Maine's ANCIENT LAW, and the writings of Sir
Henry's continental contemporaries, Bachofen, Post, Bernhoft, and Kohler, writers
grouped around the Zeitschriftfitervergleichende Rechts-wissensctaft (Journal of Com-

parative Law). He appears to be little influenced by students representing opposite
theories, especially von Amira. A number of excellent studies on primitive law have
been undertaken since Weber wrote. New information on old subjects has become
available particularly through research in the field of legal ethnology, to be discussed
below.
PART I

WHAT IS WEBER'S DESCRIPTION oF PRIMITIVE LAW 0F WRONGS? How DoEs
MODERN LAW Op WRONGS COMPARE WITH THIS DEscRIoTN?3

Max Weber states that the distinction between tort and crime "was certainly unknown in primitive administration of justice."'4 Closely related to this statement is
a second observation: "There is a complete unconcern with a notion of guilt, and
consequently, with any degree of guilt, reflecting the inner motivations and psychological attitudes. He who thirsts for vengeance is not interested in motives; he is
concerned only with the objective happening of the event by which his desire for
vengeance has been aroused. His anger expresses itself equally against inanimate
objects, by which he has been unexpectedly hurt, against animals by which he has
been unexpectedly injured, and against human beings who have harmed him unknowingly, negligently or intentionally." "Every wrong is ... a 'tort' that requires
expiation, and no tort is more than a wrong that requires expiation." 5
Weber's description implies that in primitive society the only reaction to "wrong",
which by definition is a violation of some standard or norm set by community agreement, tacit or express, is the revenge or compensation of the group or individual
injured. Perhaps we should interpret Weber's statements not quite that narrowly,
but should add that not all reactions to "wrongs" were in the nature of expiation,
but that some reactions were of religious significance, i.e. the sacrifice
We may try now to summarize Weber's opinion about primitive law of wrongs:
Primitive society knows three reactions against a person or object which "committed"
2"Only exceptionally does [Sir Henry Maine] supply references to support his opinions." "It
is often difficult to imagine what were the considerations which lead him to his conclusions, and often
it is certain that therewas no real evidence to support him." A. S. DIA.MOND, PRnnnVE LAw, London,
1935, p. 3. "The early German students of savage law again were all at once committed to the hypothesis of 'primitive promiscuity' and 'group marriage,' just as their British contemporary, Sir
Maine, was handicapped by his too narrow adhesion to the patriarchal scheme." B. MAMNOWSKI.
CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SocETrY, New York, 1932, p. 3.
WEBER, op. cit. supra, Ch. III Secs. 4 and 5.
Ibid., p. 50.
5 Ibid., p. 51, and see, The Common Law, Boston, 1949, pp. 2, et seq.
'MAX WEBER, op. cit. supra, secs. 4 and 5 passim.
Ibid., p. 56.
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a violation of a norm recognized by this society as binding, namely, satisfaction of a
desire for vengeance against this person or object, compensation for the harm done,
and expiation of the likewise harmed deity by dedication of the wrongdoer or wrongdoing object in the form of a sacrifice, perhaps through mortification and destruction
respectively, without concern for the guilt or motives of the wrongdoer or wrongdoing
object.
These criteria, according to Weber, distinguish the primitive law of wrongs from
the modem view, but especially from modern criminal justice which is "that public
concern of morality or expedience decrees expiation for the violation of a norm,""
and which obviously is-at least to some degree-concerned with the notions of guilt
and motives.' The writer here concurs with Karl von Amira in criticizing this theory
with the words: "One has to admit that [this theory] recommends itself at least
through its simplicity."' 0
Squaring these definitions of primitive and modern law of wrongs, especially
criminal justice, can we detect any significant differences? Apart from fundamental
procedural differences today which he terms "protection of a regular procedure,"' ,
Weber seems to indicate that today's public concern for morality and expedience,
which supposedly expresses itself both in the nature of those actions deemed wrongs
and in the concern with the wrongdoers' frame of mind, is the main, perhaps only
distinguishing criterion.
Accepting, for the present, Weber's opinion that the most primitive law of wrongs
did not distinguish between tort and crime, and ignoring, likewise only for the present,
our modern crime-tort distinction, can we really accept Weber's judgment about the
law of wrongs?
Let us investigate the extent to which 20th century law is concerned with morality.
We have many laws on our statute books which some concern for public morality
must have placed there and which, nevertheless, are more often broken than observed,. e.g., liquor laws, lost goods laws, gambling laws, traffic laws, divorce laws, 2
a Ibid., p. 50.
The modern tort objective, according to Weber, is "restoration", at least primarily. Ibid. p. 50.
"0DIE GERMANISCHEN TODFSSTRAFEN, Untersmhungen zur Rechs- and Rdigionsgesczichle, Munchen, 1922, in ABHA NDLUNGEN DER KONIGLICHEN AxADE~m, vol. 31, p. 3.
11WEBER, op cit. supra, p. 50.
2
2BONNGE, JUSTICE, in Reed v. Littleton, 289 N. Y. Supp. 798, 159 Misc. 853 (1932): "[Furthermore] has not my good brother overlooked the fact that a certain amount of naivete is an essential
adjunct to the judicial office? Does not the Supreme Court grind out thousands of divorces annually
upon the stereotyped sin of the same big blonde attired in the same black pajamas? Is not access to
the chamber of love quite uniformly obtained by announcing that it is a maid bringing towels or a
messenger boy with an urgent telegram? Do we not daily pretend to hush up the fact that an offending defendant is insured when every jury with an ounce of wit recognizes the defendant's lawyer
and his entourage as old friends? More than half a century ago P. T. Barnum recorded the fact that
the American people delight in being humbugged, and such is the national mood still. Nowhere is
this trait more clearly shown than in the field of gambling. A church fair or bazaar would scarcely be
complete without a bevy of winsome damsels selling chances on bed quilts, radios, electric irons,
and a host of other things. if the proceeds are to be devoted to the ladies' sewing circle or the dominie's vacation, no sin is perceived and the local prosecutor, whoever or wherever he may be, stays his
hand. But if a couple of dusky youths are apprehended rolling bones to a state of warmth, blind
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and perhaps most notably sex laws. But rarely does non-observanace of a law justify
its removal from the statute books, e.g. prohibition laws. Is it tragic that among a
segment of our population breaches of such laws are not even regarded as immoral?"
To what extent then is our modern law of wrongs concerned with expedience?
There is not a single criminologist to the writer's knowledge who disputes the fact
that it is our modern form of criminal procedure which shapes the criminal personality, viz. the experiences of the culprit on the stairway in our building of criminal
justice that lead from the police lock-up to the penitentiary, via the magistrate's
office, juvenile detention homes of various degrees, courtrooms and county jails. A
person who is not a criminal at heart by the time of his release is the exception and
not the rule. Those who confide in the invention of parole as a moral and expeditious
instrument in our criminal law administration likewise will have to face disappoint14
ments in many jurisdictions.
Are we justified in calling such a system of criminal law administration one that is
concerned with public expedience? We certainly cannot do so unless we mean by
expedience no more than to apprehend criminals and keep them in confinement for
a specified time like warehouse contents.
To what extent is our modem law of wrongs concerned with the frame of mind of
the wrongdoer? It would lead too far to cite cases of absolute liability in modem tort
law, 5 but one comparison should be made: Weber, no doubt, was familiar with some
reports about absolute liability in primitive law for persons who had left their arms
at a place where a third person had access, which third person accidentally lost his
justice perceives the infamy of the performance and the law takes its course. Sweepstakes and lotteries
are unspeakably vile, and yet through them we have contributed so many millions to the Irish hospitals that it is rumored that patriotic Irishmen cheerfully volunteer to have their tonsils and appendixes removed just to keep the hospital beds occupied and the nurses employed. For a generation
or more betting at horse races was unlawful. After this prolonged burst of morality the legislature
suddenly discovered the need of 'improving the breed of horses' and enacted art. 20 of the Membership Corporations Law (sec. 280 et seq.), followed later by chapter 440 of the Laws of 1926. In a
backhanded way this legislation restored race track betting by removing the criminal penalties.
But let no one suspect that our best citizens repair to Belmont Park and other nearby tracks for the
purpose of betting or gambling. Perish the thought, for their minds rest on higher things. Improving
the breed of horses is their aim, and the conversation, aside from formal greetings, deals solely with
sires and dams, foals and fillies, blood lines, consanguinity, and inherited characteristics. These
things a judge must believe, even at the risk of being chided as naive, because they are contemporary America." See STEPHEN AND LEvi, I ELEMENTS or THE LAW 158, Chicago, 1950.
13DR. ALFRED C. KiNSEY, Professor of Zoology, in an address delivered before the Illinois Academy of Criminology, at Allerton Park, Illinois, on May 18, 1952, stated that his nation-wide research (SExUAL BEviotn i ran HUmAN MALE, Philadelphia and London, 1948, and SEICuAL
BEHAviouR n ThE HmAN FEMALE, then in print) has revealed that 90 percent of our American
population of the years between puberty and senility violate five different sex statutes on two hundred different occasions. Compare this with the record of a primitive people like the inhabitants of
the Carolines in the Pacific. See KARIG, Tan FORTUNATE ISLANDS, New York 1948, chapters 6-8. On
The morality of our traffic rules see GEORGE E. MATHIEU, THou SiLuT NOT K.IL., XIX
VrrAL SPEECHES OF TE DAY 94 (1952).
"4See DR.JosEPH D. LomAN, article on parole policy, Chicago SUN Tnrs, June 1, 1952, pp. 10,
28, to cite only one of the many authorities.
15See PROSSER, TORTS, 1941, chapter 10.
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life by unauthorizedly handling such arms. This has been reported about several
primitive and early legal systems. 16 These laws are to be compared with the rule of
Silivan v. Creed, 7 and we have to admit that distinguishing criteria are absent.
But in the criminal law itself we have examples of little or no concern for the
offender's actual frame of mind. It was only a century ago that a man was legally
insane, and thereby excused from responsibility, when he behaved like a wild beast,
or when he could not count to three, and in many jurisdictions we still measure a
defendant's mental capacity for the commission of a criminal act by such irrational a
test as "whether he was able to distinguish between right and wrong." The results of
such a procedure frequently are pitiful. Moreover, under the present system it might
even happen on occasion that-in Weber's terms-"the protection of a regular
procedure" prevents evidence that might be highly relevant from being introduced
(e.g., for purposes of showing defendant's mental incapacity) simply because "in the
eyes of the law" it is not relevant or competent. 8
Weber states quite correctly about the man in primitive society that "his anger
expresses itself equally against inanimate objects", and we have at least some evidence that penalty was inflicted upon such inanimate objects as for instance a falling
tree which had killed the woodcutter, by burning this "delinquent" tree. Does such
behaviour differ to any considerable extent from an order for the destruction of fishnets used in violation of someone's fishing rights, or perhaps general fishing regulations? Yet, this is our reaction today. 9 The same holds true with respect to "revenge
against animals". 2 Was this then and is it today an action of revenge, as Weber
seems to imply, or has it always been a rather practical and utilitarian provision?
My conclusion could be either that 20th century law of wrongs is primitive, or
that primitive law of wrongs is quite modern; of course, I would be accused of generalizing certain specific cases which show "elements of primitive thinking" in our
modern law.' Therefore, the examples cited should not lead to any concrete judgment, they merely help to illustrate that not only do theory and practice often differ
from each other in our modern laws, but that present day law contains a number of
propositions which are quite consistent with Weber's definition of primitive law.
The question that presents itself now is: Do primitive and modern law of wrongs
1"E.g., PoLtocic AND MAITLAND, I HISTORY OF ENGIsi LAW 54, Cambridge, 1899, as to early
Anglo-Saxon law: "Legis enim est qui insdmenter peccat, scienter amender ... seems to have extended, or to have been thought by some to extend, even to harm done by a stranger with weapons
which the owner had left unguarded." A like report comes from E. SCHuLTZ-EWEPRT and LEONARD
ADAm, DAs EiNGEBOREN.EiRmECrT, OsrAraInc I, Stuttgart, 1929, VI Strafrecht, p. 289, as to the
Ruanda of former German East Africa; but we will come back to this subject later.
17It.

Rep. 317 (1904). Defendant left a loaded gun leaning on a fence on his property, next to a

public highway. The defendant's sixteen year old son found the gun. He took it with him to the high-

way and, not knowing that it was loaded, pointed it, in play, at the plaintiff. The gun went off, and
the plaintiff was injured. Held: A person who leaves a dangerous weapon at a place to which other
persons have access, is liable for injuries caused by the handling of the weapon.
"8E.g., People v. Jenko, 102 N.W. 2d 783 (Ill., 1951), esp. brief and argument for plaintiff in

error, pp. 16/17. See also Louis H. CoiaN, M RDER, MADNEss
19E.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499 (1894).
20Compare actio de paucperi with modem "Dog-bite laws".

AND THE LAW,

Cleveland, 1952.

"1A better term would be "elements which even the primitives had thought of".
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differ only in degree? We are not ready to answer this question yet, and we probably will not be able to do so until we have disposed of all particular problems.
PART II
To WnAT EXTENT DOES PRMTIVE LAW OF WRONGS DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN CRIME AND TORT?

At the outset a definition of law for the purposes of this inquiry is necessary. Law,
as the writer defines it, is the body of rules of conduct the enforcement of which is
guaranteed by community sanction. Law presupposes a community, i.e. an organized
group of human beings, which stands for its enforcement, or, perhaps vice versa, it is
the presence of law which gives a group of human beings the status of a society.
22
therefore, law without society is just as impossible as society without law
The era of our inquiry, therefore, begins when at various geographical locations
communities are formed. Much more difficult is the determination of the end of the
era of primitive law, or the beginning of modern, i.e. early modem law. We may
accept A. S. Diamond's classifications which are both convenient and logical, i.e.
the era of first "codifications"-in the general sense, not in Weber's terminology-,
namely the first compilation of written laws.? The end of the era is set arbitrarily to
an extent; the bofundaries between primitive law and early modem law are wavering.
The term "early modern law" in itself is inadequate. Our inquiry, therefore, ends
4
for the following peoples at the designated times, viz.:
BABYLONIANS:

The

CODE OF

H.xmRABI, about 2270 B.C.

JEWS: The PEN-TATEUCH, middle of second millennium, B.C., possibly as late as 7th

century B.C.
Ro~aE: The TWELVE TABLES, 451 B.C.
HI,-DUs: The LAWS OF M\AXU, about 200 B.C.
GERM.ANIC PEOPLES: The LEGES BARBARORUm, about 6th century.
INCAS: The time of the Spanish conquest of Peru, 16th century.
NORTH .AMERICAN INDIANS: Up to 20th century.
INNER AFRICAN PEOPLES: 20th century.
PACIFIC INSULAR PEOPLES: Up to 20th century.
The available sources are obvious, namely documentary evidence on stone, clay,
and paper, from which we risk inferences, and studies of twentieth century ethnologists and anthropologists. It is the cumulative value of all these sources which make
their use in modern comparative law valuable.
The workers in the field of primitive law quite frequently occupy themselves with
rather general aspects and observations, such as the development from custom to
law, or the ethical aspects of punishment. These aspects are here of secondary importance only, but it is quite significant for this inquiry whether community reaction to
a wrong in primitive society is in the form or for the purpose of retaliation, deterrence,
-On this point see R. vox HIPPEL, DER DEUTSCHE STRAFPROZESS, p. 14, see further XVOLFF,
THE RomA- LAW, NORMAN. 1951, pp. 52-53.
PRanrivE LAw, London, 1935.
;"Supplemented. This writer does not follow Diamond's dates entirely. The date of the Code
of lammurabi is in dispute. See DRIVER AND MILES, I TiI BABYLONIAN L.AWs XXIV, XXV, Oxford, 1952.
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resocialization or neutralization, all of which are present-day theories. If it is in any
of these forms that society reacts to wrong, then we must conceive of the wrong as
a crime, whereas if the reaction to a wrong is only in the form of exacting compensation to the person or group of persons (excepting the community itself as a group of
persons) harmed, then we must treat it as a tort.
It is likewise of importance here whether primitive society acts from magical motives, religious conviction (fear and satisfaction of the deity), from instinct, or for
utilitarian reasons. Needless to say, just as at present we find that in our law almost
all crimes are also torts and must be compensated for, or as we have punitive elements
in our tort law in the nature of punitive damages, we may expect such an interchange
of notions in primitive legal systems. It is undoubtedly true and here not contested
that among primitive peoples the use of punitive damages in tort law was considerably larger than it is today. This explains, in part, the fact that the area of strictly
criminal law was considerably smaller than it is among modern peoples. 25 But what
I shall dispute strongly is Weber's assertion that primitive legal systems are entirely
devoid of a branch of law called criminal law. In the following I shall discuss a selection of provisions from legal systems of a number of primitive peoples in an attempt
to show that there was an area of criminal law in each one of these systems.
1.

GERMANIC LAWS

The Leges Barbarorummake a marked distinction between torts and crimes, e.g.,
sec. 49 Lex Thuringorum: "Who not wilfully but by some accident kills a human
being or wounds him, shall pay the lawful compensation." But e.g., sec. 24 Lex Saxonum: "Who conspires either against the kingdom or the life of the king of the Francs
26
'
or his sons, shall be punished with the capital punishment.
In the case of the first example the law is clearly of tort, "shall pay the lawful
compensation," in the second example the conspiracy appears as a crime, "shall be
punished with the capital punishment."
We have some knowledge about Germanic law even prior to the Leges Barbarorum,
e.g., the Goths at the time of Ulfilas (4th century) declared the serious wrongdoer
to be the enemy of king, people and God. He was named a "wolf," for like the wolf
he was destined to death. Not only could he be killed at sight, but being on his own
in the wilderness itself meant sure death. wWith respect to this "wolf declaration" Schroeder says that the Goths made a
distinction between the cases where the evil-doer was apprehended and cases where
25Cherry calls the widespread use of punitive damages among primitive peoples a "Penal Law"
as distinguished from "Criminal Law" which, as he believes, came into existence at a much later
date in historical development. R. R. CHERRY, LECTURES ON TIHE GROWTiH OF CRIMLNAL LAW IN
ANCIENT CommuN Irms, London, 1890, lecture 1.
2' 49 LEX TiruRINGoRuM: Qui nolens sed casit quodlibel homitten vzdneravil vel occiderit, composiliowne legitimamn solvel. 24 LEx SAxoNm: Qui in regnat redin regemn Francormy vd filios djus de
tole consilialus fuerit, capite punialur. Edition of the LEGES BARBARORUM in SCdRIFTEN DER
AKADEmIE FUR DEUTscuEs REcT, GERmANENREcHTE.
' ULFILAS, in his bible translation, translated "condemned to death" with "gaworgjan danpan".
i.e. declaring a wolf. Judgment or sentence was translated with "worgipa", which in itself seems to
prove that wolf declaration was the only public penalty among the Goths. See RicraRD SCHRODFR,
LEIRBCtCn DER DFuTSCimE. RECItTSGESCI[ICIIT-, Leipzig, 1894, p. 73.

GERHARD 0. W. MUELLER

[Vol. 46

he was at large. In case the criminal was in the hands of the judicial authority, he
was destined to the gods. The deity was asked whether it would accept the sacrifice;
if not, the "wolf" was let loose for a "get-away." This penalty seems to have applied
to all heavy breaches of the peace (Friedbruche),whereas minor breaches of the peace
were mere torts, hence subject to compensation.
Brunner, who also is convinced of the sacral importance of the criminal law of the
old Germans, lists the various methods of sacrifice (death penalty) for the serious
peace breaker who had offended the gods.2
The sacral importance of the serious breaches of the peace is disputed by some
scholars who think that too much emphasis has been placed on religion in primitive
criminal law. But the feeling that a deity has been offended (or can be offended at all)
certainly has had its part in the shaping of the law and still has its impact today.2
Yet the fact that the peace had been breached might have been just as important for
inflicting a heavier, namely the death penalty, which still is reflected in our lawA0
Von Amira supports the dual aspect of the Germanic criminal law, classifying the
wolf declaration, common to all Germanic peoples, as a profane law, the death penalty
as a sacral law. This view is criticized by Mitteis with the words "This does31not seem
to correspond to the unity of archaic feeling of justice" (Recktsempfitden).
Schmidt, quite correctly, states that though penalizing was not yet a monopoly
of the community (society, state), there was at least the ever present likelihood that
penalty will be the consequence of certain norm violations.n It is true that vengeance
of the injured person or sib was frequently the only penalty, it nevertheless was in
the nature of a penalty since it was sanctioned by the society which immunized (or
prescribed!) the deed of vengeance. By the time Tacitus wrote (A.D. 98) the community sanctions had become more humane. Many appeared then in the form of the
enforcement of a bot (Busse, blood-money), but quite frequently accompanied by a
fine, fredus.
Tacitus reports about the Germanic blood money system as follows: "But hostilities
do not last forever, as even manslaughter will be compensated for with a certain number of cattle or arms, and the whole household accepts this satisfaction.",, About the
"sacral" (criminal) punishment he writes: "It is also possible to make accusations
and apply for infliction of the death penalty before the assembly. The differences of
penalties depend on the (nature of the) crime. Traitors and deserters they hang on
trees, cowards, war objectors and people bodily disgraced they drown in mud and
swamps, even throwing wattlings on top."34
2 See HELRICH BRUNNER, GRUNDZUGE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSGESC1ICHTE,

Leipzig 1901, p. 18.

§§166-168 B.St.G.B. (German Penal Code).
Crim. Code §140: "Murder is the unlawful killing of a
"Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Ch. 38, §358; Ill.
human being, in the peace of the people," etc.
1
' DEUTSCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE, Munchen & Berlin, 1949, pp. 19-20.
29 See

EBERIIARD SCITMIDT, EINFUHRUNG IN DIE GEscmcHTE DER DEUTSCUEN STRAFRECHTsPmLEGE,

Gottingen. 1947.
33GERMANIA, cap. 21 (first century A.C.): "Nec implacabiles durant (inimicitiae);lictur enim
etiai homocidium certo peccorum, armorumquc numero; recipitquesatisfactionum universa doas."
"4Ibid., cap. 12: "Licer apud conciium quoqgu accusare et discriminem capitis intendere, dis
tincio poenaruin ex delicto, proditores et transfugas arboribus suspendunt; ignavos et imbelles et
corpore infame caeno ac palude, iniecta insuper crate, inergunt."
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Tacitus obviously talks in Roman terms, and one should not infer from his report
that in fact the death penalty was of a sacral nature. But even so, the infliction of a
penalty, from whatever considerations and under whatever aspects, as a consequence
of norm violation, is exactly what we define as criminal in its nature.
Fehr likewise believes in the dual system of Germanic criminal law, the sacral and
the profane system. 5 In the former system he lists sacral proper, the breach of the
peace of the gods,38 sacral, in the wider sense, serious breach of the peace of the people,
e.g. fornication, arson and homicide. The latter group contains such breaches of the
peace as originally were subject to community-sanctioned revenge, vengeanc later
composition and fine (fredus), but, in certain cases even the death penalty.Y But
Fehr is convinced that both systems, sacral and profane, are criminal law. "Criminal
law and deity are inseparably chained to each other.",
Von Amira in his TODESSTRAPE proceeds with an admirably scholarly minuteness to
attack the theory that primitive law always developed from what Weber terms "a
tort that requires expiation."3 9 At least those wrongs which are followed by the death
penalty, always a primary and immediate reaction of the society as an entity, must
be regarded as crimes in a very modern sense. Of course, we cannot expect that society
at all times regarded the same acts as evil deeds. It is our task to find whether society
always regarded some acts as evil deeds and regarded some reactions to these deeds
as a punishment. Do not we 20th century peoples ourselves differ from country to
country, or state to state and even city to city as to what constitutes an evil deed, a
crime? Do we not take account of that in modern law?40
Von Amira refers to early Scandinavian law as an illustration: "Whoever carries
his arms against his almighty king and against his country, wherein he is born, 'han
hawaerfore giirt hals' " (he has forfeited his neck).4
Pollock and Maitland, writing about the Anglo-Saxons in Britain, state that "some
of the gravest offenses, especially against the king and his peace, are said to be 'bollas', that is, the offender is not entitled to redeem himself at all, and is at the king's
mercy." 41 The Anglo-Saxons likewise knew the distinction between wergild, bot, and
wile, (fine), the latter clearly a criminal penalty. But the bot has to be regarded as a
compensation (tort), though it may carry punitive elements in the nature of punitive
damages; the wergild clearly is a simple tort recovery.
2. ROMN LAW

Kunkel infers that the primitive Romans had a criminal law system quite similar
to that of the Germanic peoples almost a thousand years later. His inference was
'5R.

Fomm, DEurscHE REcnTSGEscHicHTE, Berlin,
36Reference to Tacitus, GEur NIA, cap. 40.
-Fehr's

interpretation of Tacitus,

GERMANIA,

1948.

cap. 12, "concilium" as "verdict" in the Roman

sense.

38Ibid., p. 14: "Strafrecht und GoIlheit sind untrennbar miteinander verkettel."
9VoN AimA, op. cit. supra, esp. pp. 3-4.
40

Rex v. Esop, 7 Car. and P. 456 (1836), but see Regina v Machekequonabe, 28 Ont. Rep. 309.
(1898).
41 UPL.ams, 1 Mb. 15 pr. This clearly is unrelated to tort.
4' POLLOCK AND 'MAiTLAND, I History of English Law 48, Cambridge, 1899.
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based upon sources that became known after the primitive Roman era had passed,
but as he said, "the strict traditionalism of the Romans offers at least some warranty"
for the inference that the law of the early primitive era was similar to that of the
later phase.41This has been explained on the ground that both systems have the same
Indo-Germanic origin. But if we accept the theories of modem ethnological jurists,
then this relationship is of lesser importance than commonly thought.
Judging from the fragments of the XXII Tables, we may infer that all "penalty"
once was 7roLvyj (poena), which not only refers to a blood-money; but Sallust, Livius,
Ovid and others use poena with the meaning of "vengeance." In some instances of
norm violations it was sufficient to "dainnum sarcire," (repair the injury) but in other
cases it becomes quite clear that poena had also a punitive character, or had such
character in addition, e.g. a multiple of the value of the harm caused to property had
to be paid. But apparently minor wrongs, e.g. batteries, were mere torts. However,
the penal character of the reactions to certain major physical wrongs is very obvious
in the community threat that in case a pacdum is not made, either by refusal of the
plaintiff or the defendant, talio will result. 44 Talio, unfortunately, still seems to be
with us in 20th century legal thinking. 45 The reciprocal character which talio had in
primitive law, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, is an immensely important
aspect of justice, not only civil justice, but especially criminal justice. We will come
back to this point later. If we furthermore believe the early law writers then Roman
46
law likewise knew the death penalty for some wrongs at earliest times.
Wolff, one of the most brilliant writers on Roman law, shows quite clearly the
difference between ins and fas. lus included the profane criminal law. Fas included
sacral criminal law, such as was dealt with by the pontifex. Subject to the latter were
abuse of the imperium of the palerfamilias,and certain kinds of theft or gross breaches
of faith. Violators of the sacral criminal law were declared ignominius and suffered
some curtailment of their legal capacities through the pontifex.4 7 But sacral criminal
law provided for additional and more severe punishment for certain violations, to
which we will refer shortly.
The oldest mention of the difference between ius civilis and ins criminalisis found
in a rescript issued by Secerus and Caracalla in A.D. 194: Cod. Iust. 2.1.2., ascribed
to Septimius Severus, at the very beginning of the absolute monarchy.4
The two most thorough workers in the field of Roman criminal law are Rein and
Mommsen. Both writers are primarily jurists and not sociologists in the modern
sense. They both say that Roman criminal penalties most likely had their origin in
sacral law, i.e. satisfaction of the offended gods, 49 or that it grew out of the human
50
primeval instinct of revenge for suffered wrongs.
"

V KU'IKEL, RomsCsdE RxcHTSGESCmcnTF., Heidelberg, 1948, p. 140.

41All of these provisions are in Table VIII.
45F. J. P. VEALE, ADVANCE TO BARBARISM, Appleton, Wisc., 1953.

op. cit. supra, p. 22.
47A very modern form of penalty, at least as "Nebensirafe" (additional penalty), compare with
46 KUNKEL,

§§32 et seq. B.St.G.B. (German Penal Code).
48 WoLFp, op. cit. supra, p. 70.
1"RIx's DAS CRIhINALREcIIT DER ROMER AND MOMISEN's RosnscuEs STRAFRECHT, both Leipzig, 1844 and 1899, resp.
50See RrmNz. op. cil.
supra, pp. 24 et seq., Mommsen, op. cit. supra, pp. 3 et seq.
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It is by the very definition of the term society that the group of human beings
forming that society are in a state of interdependency, obeying and enforcing certain
set norms. Therefore, if it is society, as distinguished from the associations of other
animals of the species of zooim politicon, then we necessarily have a regulation of
both the instinctive obedience to deity with regulated enforcement of penalties for
offending it, and a regulation of profane wrongs with enforcement by threat and execution of punishments of fixed metes and bounds. This is where the discovery of the
instinctive human feeling for reciprocity and balance enters the picture. This feeling
for balance is the creator of justice, i.e. a stable "quantity and quality" of punishment
for each recurring wrong.51 The only profane wrongs that were punished in primitive
society were probably such acts which society deemed detrimental to its continued
existence.
On the other hand, as Rein and Mlommsen make clear, there was a sphere of private
wrongs, which community in its then primitive forms did not bother with since they
were not of such a nature as would endanger the very existence of this society. It is
here where, at least for a while, the unregulated revenge instinct of the wronged
person or group of persons demanded retaliation. The check on the "justness" of both
regulated (criminal) and unregulated (civil) wrong-consequence (Unrecltsfolge) is,
as our modem anthropologists establish, and as has been mentioned before, the in52
stinctive sense of everything human for the "balance of the scales."
But these civil and criminal, or private and public reactions to wrong by no means
form the "cake of custom" as is thought by most writers. It may be true that the
sphere of public wrongs is rather small in primitive society, but it certainly is present
as a distinct group, existing side by side with the other distinct group, the private
wrongs.
Rein lists for the time of the monarchy the following crime groups: 1. Acts against
piety and removal of the sacred boundary stones, both punishable with sacratio capitis
(death penalty), as of sacral nature; 2. Criminapublica, crimes against the existence
of the state, esp. treason and coniuratio (conspiracy), as of profane nature. From
these two groups he distinguishes the concern of the state in enforcing the proper
observation of the limits of lalio for private wrongs. But some of these private wrongs
also might have been treated as public wrongs. These latter, however, seem to represent civil law proper.
Mommsen, who calls this latter category "Privalsrafrecht" (Private Penal Law),
is perhaps not quite justified in doing so. This term, though stemming from the oldest
sources, is somewhat misleading, since in the enforcement of the law of these private
wrongs the private aspects, compensatory, were much larger than the punitive aspects, as we can infer from the sources. They apparently were very much in the
nature of our malicious torts, which result in punitive damages.3
Mommsen made a very valuable contribution to our knowledge of Roman criminal
law with his RosuscIIEs STRAFRECIT. From his detailed studies he seems convinced
51Some legal philosophers regard the "balancing [of]
awards and punishments in the scale of
CAN,. Tur: SE-,I OF
T-JUSTICH:, New York, 1949. pp. 15 et seq.
52 See part III, infra.

merit" as merely one of several factors constituting proto-justice. E.g., E. N.
0

See MOm,., op. cit. supra, pp. 7 et seq.
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that penal law started with the reaction to wrongs against the security of society, and
that such wrongs were not compensable in a tort manner. It was only side by side
with it that private law of compensation grew."
The confusion which seems to exist stems from the fact that some scholars are comparing our modern substantive criminal law with primitive law and they find that
many acts which are crimes in our times were mere wrongs in primitive society, or
were even regarded as lawful. It has been pointed out that this is irrelevant even
though true, for we have to find whether some acts, no matter what they were, were
regarded as injurious enough to the safety of society to require punishment to prevent
recurrence. The important fact is that this punishment differs from mere unregulated
-or even regulated-vengeance or compensation by its psychological significance,
and by the fact that it was inflicted in behalf of the society.
3. LAWS or BABYxON-A AND ANci-cr PALESTN
In 1902 a French archaeological expedition under M. de Morgan found a pillar of
dark stone, eight feet high and two feet across, at Susa near the Persian Gulf. This
find turned out to be the most amazing discovery of an ancient legal document. The
pillar bore inscribed the 282 sections of what is now known as the Code of Hammurabi
from about 2270 B.C. "It represents the law of probably the most advanced of
ancient civilizations-Babylonia. At the time when we first meet the nations in history, their laws are in a primitive stage (relatively speaking). This is true of the Jews,
Arabs, the Hindus, the Chinese, and the Germanic and Celtic stocks. Even the Romans, at the time of the Twelve Tables (about 300 B.C.) were still primitive. Only
Egypt can be compared with Babylon. But Babylon had already outstripped Egypt,
at the time of Hammurabi, in the development of commerce and commercial law.' '
Though on a higher level of culture than many other primitive legal systems discussed here, the Code nevertheless reveals a wealth of information about our subject,
the distinction between tort and crime in primitive society. We find a marked distinction between crime and tort. In the following I shall list the relevant sections of
the Code of Hammurabi in comparison with similar provisions of the Mosaic law.
For purposes of convenience I did not follow the section order of the Code, as logical
as its organization is5" but grouped the sections under more familiar headings.
It becomes thus clear that in ancient Babylonian law there was a distinct area of
criminal law. The gravest crimes were those of witchcraft and those directed against
the administration of justice and religion, as evidenced by their treatment in the first
sections of the code. The elaborate treatment of crimes against the sex taboo indicates a close second in importance. From all that appears, Mosaic law was very simi' Ibid., pp. 58 et seq., and pp. 4 et seq.
51WiGmo RE, The Code of Hammurabi, NORTHWESTERN UNWrRsrrY BuazrTnT, Vol. XIV, No.
25 (1914), reprinted in Koconuumc AND WIGMORE, I EvoLuTioN o" LAW 387. The following discussion of the Code and of the law of ancient Palestine is based on W. W. D.Avrs, The Codes of
Hammurabiand Moses, reprinted in Ch.XIV of KocoUnx AeN WiGMORE, supra. In this discussion
torts which we also regard as torts today will not be discussed.
56 "It is a work of art and the drafting... is clearly excellent. The terminology is well chosen
and used with unerring skill and accuracy." DRivER AND M=s. op. cit.
supra, p. 49.
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lar in its penalties for these crimes. There is no indication in either legal system that
these crimes were ever subject to civil retaliation or compensation. In the next area
of crimes, those against property and the person, there is some divergence between
the two systems. In Babylonian law theft appears as both tort and crime, it may be
either, depending on the circumstances, and in some cases it appears as tort-crime
hybrid. This could be an indication that most sorts of theft were, at one time, mere
torts, as it was in other primitive systems. Mosaic law, admittedly on a lower cultural
level-at least in most respects-regards theft only as tort. The law of homicide is
clear under 'Mosaic law where strictly retaliatory thinking demanded the death
penalty of the perpetrator in all cases. It is not clear in Babylonian law. Here the
etaliatory principles appear in mayhem cases, but only occasionally in manslaughterr
provisions. A general murder provision is lacking altogether. Only the case of husband
murder is discussed. Were we to apply our construction rule inclusio Uniius est excusio
allerius, we would arrive at the conclusion that cases of murder, other than those
special cases mentioned in the code, were regarded as not important enough to be
dealt with by society as a whole. Hence, murder might have been left to private
compensation. But so to conclude would be only one possibility among many possible
guesses. 17 It might here be mentioned that in the next following sections we shall
meet other primitive people who (likewise) do not regard murder as a crime in the
modem sense. s
4.

CoNrm.oRARY Pgr-iTrvE LAws

We will now turn to the consideration of the contributions of ethnological jurisprudence, a science which was not nearly as developed at Weber's time as it is now. If
it was not only excusable but even natural that Weber and his contemporaries arrived
at results which now appear dubious, it is not understandable that some modem
jurists still carry on in the old and outworn tracks. MIitteis, for instance, in A.D.
1949, places more reliance on folk-fable and myth than on the results of modem
comparative ethnological jurisprudence, 59 and thereby still shares Binding's antipathy and suspicion of " non-legal" contributants. °
We are now quite familiar with the legal system of the Incas of Peru both before
and after the Spanish conquest. Inca law made the following acts a crime: 1. theft,
2. adultery, 3. murder, 4. blasphemy against the sun, 5. removal of a bridge (because
of the importance of transportation over a terrain criss-crossed with ravines). The
17 According to DIAMOND, op. cit. supra, the code is not a codification of law but of laws, i.e. it is
not all inclusive. (pp. 27 et seq.) "As for murder, the explanation, in all probability, is that the rule
had not been altered by legislation, and there was therefore no occasion to mention it." p. 29. Accord: DRIVER AND ML.ES, op. cit. supra, sec. 4.
5SFor discussion of further ancient primitive legal systems reference may be had to A. S. DIAmoND, op. cit. supra, KocoUtEK AND WNIGMORE, op. cit. supra, and Hvi w E. GoLDIN, HEBREW

CRrhuNAL LAw AND PRocEDuRE,

New York, 1952, especially ch. 1,for a discussion of the distinction

between crime and tort in Mosaic law.
51See M rrEis, op. cit. supra, pp. 2, 20. Note: "Myth as historical 'evidence' is not sound, since
primitives have a way of erasing the uncertainty of unknown origins by an act of fiction which, when
hailed as truth, gives sanctity to prevailing mores." LLEivELLY AND HO EBEL, Tn CHEYET-NNE
1941, pp. 67-68.
WAY,
0
6 KARL B NDING, HANDBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS, vol. I, Leipzig, 1885.
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vengeance or (private) compensation aspect is completely lacking in Inca law. The
nature of the acts deemed crimes shows clearly that both reverence for deity (the sun)
and "Zweck", 6 ' the utilitarian aspect, were instrumental in Inca "legislation." All
crimes were capital, "the aim of punishment being to rid society from the wrong-doer
and thereby to eradicate the evil." ' Very accurate observations have been made on our North American Indians by
Llewellyn and Hoebel.6 Some of the excellent conclusions must be quoted in full:
"What is clear is that one has no business expecting of any primitive culture that its
law shall have achieved the official and doctrinal unity allegedly found in the modem
state." 14 "Tort and Crime. Against such a background of the problems which force
law-men to devise law ways, law-concepts, and law rules, many of the common 'contrasts' between primitive law and modern lose much of their seeming contrast; and
they gain understandability thereby. There is, for instance, the conception that primitive law runs much more heavily to 'tort', i.e., private wrong, than to 'crime', or
public wrong. Viewed purely as a matter of procedure, there is truth in this. But it is
when viewed as a matter of substance and function that the truth takes on its needed
perspective. The fact is that in any group or culture any wrong concerns the whole
to some extent at the same time that it gives concern to the more particularly aggrieved.6 5 If it did not concern the whole, the aggrieved would be looked upon as an
aggressor, not as a redresser, when he undertakes his redress." 6 " 'Crime' differs
from 'tort' not in kind, but in the effective predominance for purposes of administration of the public or the private elements, both of which are always present to some
degree."'
These authors refer to the Cheyenne law of homicide, which was both a crime and a
tort, but not a tort-crime hybrid, just as in developed law. "What distinguishes primitive from developed law in regard to 'public' and 'private' enforcement thus becomes
the range and clarity of available administrative machinery.' As to the origin of
61RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS MEAs TO AN END, translated by Isaac Hussik, New York, 1924.

"Purpose [Zweck] is the creator of the entire law, * * * there is no legal rule which does not owe its
origin to a purpose, i.e. to a practical motive." (p. liv) "*** I define law in reference to its content
as the form of the security of the conditions of social life, procured by the power of the state." (p.
330) "The higher a good stands, the more thought we take to make it secure. * * * The list of penalties gives the standard of values for social goods." (p. 367) "According to my theory, utility forms
the sole concern of the law." (pp. 393, 394).
2

1 LEox

R. YANKwlcn, LAW AND ORDER UNDER THE INCAS, 1949, reprinted from 22 So. Cal. L.R.

132, 149.
6 Op. cit. supra.
64 Ibid., p. 60, emphasis mine.
15Note supplied. Among the Wyandots the sphere of private wrongs was considerably smaller
than the sphere of public wrongs. But the tribe supervised the enforcement of all compensations for
private wrongs, in some cases imposing punitive damages. The only major public wrongs, not harming an individual tribal comrade, were treason and witchcraft, punished by death. The penalty of
outlawry was available. Minor crimes (adultery) were punished by mutilation. J. W. POWELL, 16th
Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology. Reprinted in KocouREK AND WIGHORE, I
Evolution of Law 279 et seq. (1915).
"Ibid., pp. 47-48.
' Ibid., p. 49.
J bid., p. 49.
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punishment among the Cheyennes the authors deny the correctness of assertions of
other scholars (especially the Romanists) that the origin of law was in religion. They
find that Cheyenne homicide law was originally affected by the supernatural, whereas
theft shows clearly secular origin. Murder is not a matter for blood vengeance, though
it might have been such at earlier times, but it apparently always was considered a
"sin", a sacral crime.6
Again, we find the "Zweck" for the punishment, i.e. not much "fuss" was made
about theft of a chattel in daytime, yet, theft of a horse in daytime was serious. °
Ialinowski likewise reports about a primitive people, even less developed in their
state of culture, the inhabitants of Melanesia. He too denies that criminal law had a
single sacral origin, having found much evidence of the notion of "reciprocity" among
these very primitive peoples. Malinowski expresses the conclusions of his experiences
with the Melanesians, amply supported by findings reported in his "Crime and
Custom in Savage Society,"' in the following way:
"The fundamental function of law [of the Melanesians] is to curb certain natural
propensities, to hem in and control human instincts and to impose a non-spontaneous
compulsory behaviour, in other words, to ensure a type of cooperation which is based
on mutual concessions and sacrifices for a common end." 2 "There exists finally the
sanction of tribal punishment, due to reaction in anger and indignation of the whole
community. By this sanction human life, property, and last not least, personal
honor are safeguarded in a Melanesian community." [These] "sanctions might be
descrived as 'criminal law'-very often over-emphasized by anthropologists and
falsely connected with the problem of 'government' and 'central authority' and invariably tom out of its proper context of other legal rules." 73 "Each class of rules just
enumerated is distinguishable from the rest by the sanctions and by its relation to
the sacral organization of the tribe and to its culture." 74
We must conceive of Malinowski's words as a critique of-among others-Weber's
opinion, i.e. the emphasis on strong central government as a factor determining the
creation of criminal law.
Other studies among Pacific-insular peoples, i.e. those of Micronesia, the Carolines,
Nauru, Ponape and Jap, have been made by E. Schultz-Ewert and Leonard Adam. 75
76
The authors find almost everywhere 1. punishment of the offender of sacral law,
7
but also certain profane norms,7 held important for communal safety. Besides this
system of law enforcement is again 2. the system of obligatory and "supervised"
vengeance between persons and sibs. Vengeance is sanctioned only for specified
" Ibid., chap. on Homicide and the Supernatural,pp. 132 et sequ.
70 So we find in most Germanic laws that the theft of bee hives was often a capital offense, because
of the importance of honey as the only source of sugar, (esp. in the manufacture of "Met"?); e.g.,
LEx SAxoNum, secs. 30 and 31.
LLondon and New York, 1932.
72Ibid., pp. 65-66.

'3Ibid., p. 64.
Ibid., pp. 65-66.
75DAs EINGEBORENENRECHT, Stuttgart, 1929.

76E.g., death penalty for evil magic among the Usambara, ibid. p. 320.

Certain thefts and other breaches of trust among the Mbaga, ibid. p. 320.

GERHARD 0. W. MUELLER

[Vol. 46

wrongs. A third system of reaction to wrongs is clearly in the nature of tort, namely
by compensation.
The authors' reports about the African peoples of the former German imperial
colonies, East Afrika, Kamerun and Togo are quite similar. The nature of reactions
to norm-violations of the second and third category becomes usually more humane,
e.g. blood money takes the place of vengeance, where peoples live under a stronger
central authority, seemingly an indication of higher culture, and evidence in support
of the "central authority theory."
MlacLean and Dugmore, who studied the law of the Amaxosa tribe of the Kafirs,
found that the legal rules falling into the latter two categories warrant a classification
into what we now call criminal and civil law. They report that "a distinction obtains
in some respects similar to that which exists amongst us between Criminal and Civil
law. In one class of cases the chief is always considered the aggrieved party, and the
action is always entered on his behalf. In the other, the people are the only parties
concerned, the chief having to do with the matter in his capacity as judge merely.
The principle which regulates the classification of cases is, however, one that makes
a very different division of the civil from the criminal to that which obtains in civilized
jurisprudence. This principle is, that a man's goods are his own property, but his
person is the property of his chief. Thus, if his possessions be invaded, he claims redress
for himself; but if his person be assaulted, and bodily injury be the result, it becomes
his owner's concern. .

.."

Probably the most valuable contribution to ethnological jurisprudence has been
made by R. Thurnwald. 9 Thurnwald's theory, arrived at after extensive studies,
reaches further than any other theory known in this field. Most primitive society,
i.e. oragnized groups of human beings without any central authority worthy to be
given that name, always knew two and no more "public offenses", i.e. violations of
the sex-taboo and black magic. Murder or theft were regarded as not sufficient to
warant community interference, since the community itself was not endangered by
such wrongs. Whereas the "punishment aspect" entered criminal law at this point, or
here laid the foundation for it, the notion of "criminal justice" was not born yet. It
entered only with the coming into existence of blood vengeance. Thurnwald calls this
blood vengeance the "expression of the original feeling for justice and ethics, which
establishes balance and fairness among the participants."80 Since our aim of criminal
justice is of the same nature, Thurnwald regards the community sanctioned (and
controlled) blood vengeance the progenitor of our modem criminal justice, though
the phenomenon of punishment was inherited from the above mentioned "original"
crimes.
Thurnwald's theory is not conjectural, it is based on an enormous amount of research and field work.
"M
'NAcLEAN AND DU GmORE, A COMPENInum OF K.EiR LAWS AND CUSTOMS, Grahamstown,
Cape of Good Hope, 1906, p. 35. Reprinted in Joim H. WIGnomE, A KALEMoscOPs or JUSTICE,
Washington, D. C., 1941, p. 408.
79
WERDmi, WANDEL UND GESTALTUNG DES REcirEs Ii LicHTE DER VoLXERFORSCUNG, Berlin
& Leipzig, 1934.
8"Ibid., p. 10.
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SUMMARY OF PART II

I have attempted to show how the results of the research done by 20th century
scholars square with the fundamental findings of Thurnwald, which just have been
discussed. Clarity on all points has not been achieved yet. This can be explained by
the youth of the modern research methods and the fact that the world directs its
attention at present to apparently more important subjects.
By comparing primitive law of various culture levels we can see, furthermore, how
clearly A. S. Diamond's theory of legal development is supported: The "history of
law is forever repeating itself, and the same stages that were reached many thousands
of years ago in the east, are being reached and passed in parts of the modern world." 8'
This is the impression every student of primitive law will get after comparing primitive law of various peoples. All more recent writers in the field share this experience.
"... Identity of usage did not arise from the adoption by one nation of the laws or
institutions of another, but rather from the inherent principles of human nature. The
close similarity between the early institutions of very distant races as regards Penal
Law is extremely remarkable." 3
Among the most primitive societies, with whose birth law came into existence, it
was penal law, and not compensatory (tort) law which originated with punishment
for certain primeval crimes; but it was criminaljusticethat originated with the reaction to other wrongs, in the form of blood vengeance, in form controlled by instinctive
feelings for "justness" and "fairness."
The law of compensation for harm done came much later, in lieu of some of the
permissible vengeance reactions, and it existed side by side with both genuine punishment and with remaining vengeance reactions, until it finally replaced all vengeance
reactions at a certain point of cultural development.
"Whether and what will be punished depends partially on moral valuations, partially on utilitarian needs," 83 but "forget (European) traditions if you want to judge
the law of primitive peoples." 4
PART

I

iT TRUE, AS WEBER STATES, THAT PR.fmTIVE LAW OF WRONGS DOES NOT

Is

CONCERN\ ITSELF WITH PSYCHoLoGi.m

ATTITUDES?

At the outset, a definition of what we are looking for is necessary: Do primitive
peoples punish the norm violator only for the result of the misdeed, and that they do
81

Op.cit. supra, p. 1.

82RicaARD R. Cirmy, LECTURES ON THE GRowni or CRIrINAL LAw IN AxNCIENT CoMmuNiTIEs,

London, 1890, p. v.
83
Ibid., pp. 9-10. Not only did and do the primitives have different ideas about what should be
punished, but their ideas of how these wrongs should be punished differed very much from our own
ideas. Our number one mode of punishment, imprisonment, was probably unknown to most primitive peoples. One rare reference to imprisonment may be found in section 310 of the Laws of Manu:
"Let the king carefully restrain the wicked by three methods-by imprisonment, by putting them
in fetters, and by various (kinds of) corporal punishments." KocoUEK AND WIGwMORE, 1 EvoLUTIoN
OF LAW
493, Boston, 1915.
8
1R. R. CiElmui-, op. cit. supra, p. 15.
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punish we have just seen, or do they consider the delinquent's attitude, i.e. psychological attitude, "frame of mind", or "mens rea"? Do they regard or disregard intent,
negligence, malice aforethought, mental capability, etc.? Does the primitive law of
wrongs only know "Erfolgshaftung" (strict liability for the harm done)?
The inference from Max Weber's statements, quoted at the outset of this paper,
that we today are concerned with all these problems, and that primitive law of
wrongs was wholly unconcerned with them. Of course, the statement that the present
day law of wrongs is concerned with all these problems, requires explanations; some
have been given in part I. It would be improper to say that modem law judges the
delinquent by his inner motivations and psychological attitudes. Apart from the fact
that modem criminal law contains a number of crimes, for the commission of which
the inner motivations and psychological attitudes of the delinquent are entirely irrelevant, weare today (almost) never concernedwith motivations at all, and as to psychological attitudes in the sense of "intent", we are merely trying to take them into consideration. It is true that a person of mental incapacity, e.g. insanes, etc.," will not be
held responsible for his misdeeds. But the test and limits of these defenses arearbitrary
and imperfect. The intent of persons found mentally capable, or of those who do not
claim mental incapacity,--its exact definition is not relevant here-is judged primarily
by the extrinsic circumstances of the particular deed. That under such arbitrary rules
ethical injustice may occur from time to time does not mean that this kind of judging
psychological attitudes is senseless or futile. Improvements have been made and are
being made. We are simply trying to do the best with the means and knowledge available to us. Max Weber, undoubtedly, was aware of this dichotomy. His statements,
therefore, must mean that society in primitive form has either no knowledge or means
available at all, or, if it does, it does not try to "do the best" with them. It simply
does not judge the "psychological attitudes" of the culprit, that this is so in all primitive laws of wrongs, that only the result of a particular act determines whether the
particular culprit is to be punished or held liable. The truth of this statement is the
issue.
1.

GERMANic LAWS

Few inferences are possible from the earliest reports of Germanic law, by Caesar
and Tacitus. The oldest reliable documentary evidence is contained in the leges of the
6th century and thereafter. In section 49 of the Lex Thuringorum we read: "Who unknowingly but accidentally wounds or kills a human being, shall pay the lawful
compensation." If the author of the lex specifically says that "accidental killing" or
"accidental mayhem" shall have the same legal consequences, if done "nolens sed
casu","6 ("not wilfully but accidentally") then this is an indication that there must
have been at least a doubt as to the like treatment of wilful and accidental injury.,

81

In American criminal law jokingly referred to as the "in"-group, viz.: INsanes, INfants, INtoxicated persons, INcorporations, INdians, all with exceptions.
88 The Irish at the time of St. Patrick (middle of 5th century), considered to be primitive, knew
the distinction between killing with "intention" or "by foul deed" and unintentional killing. The
death penalty was only applied to uncompensated and intentional killing. RICHARD R. CmHRRY.
LECTURES ON THE GROWTH OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ANCIENT COMMtrXITIES, London, 1890, p. 19.
8- "Si nolens sed casu quolibet hominem vulneravit vel occiderit, compositionem legitimam solvat."
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A study of the Lex Saxonumn is even more fruitful: in section 22 we read: "The instigator of the perjury shall redeem the hand of the innocent perjuror."' The author of
the perjury, but not the ignorant perjuror will be punished. In section 38, arson, we
find an express reference to psychological criteria: "Suo tantum consilio volens"
("by his own decision").
It is quite important that distinctions are often made, in the measure of punishment, between crimes committed at day time, and those committed at night time.
This observation applies likewise to crimes which carried less punishment of committed in an open way, as compared with a like crime committed in a secret and
wicked manner. We will refer to such instances below. How have these and similar
provisions been treated by the Germanist legal historians? A review of some seems
appropriate:
Schroeder says that "the old Germans shared with all primitive peoples the incapability of distinguishing between evil intent (fara, gezwaed, vili) and mere negligence
(vapawerk, mmweldich dede)." Yet in the same breath he goes on to explain that what
has been described as mere negligence did not carry any punishment, but was followed
by simple tort liability, if the culprit would report his deed to the authorities.
The only meaning which Schroeder's statement possibly can have, is that the old
Germans were not too good in judging by the circumstances of the deed what was
fara and what was vapawerk. But does it follow that the old Germans had no concern
for the "intent" at all? The defense of "mere negligence" in Germanic law was restricted to certain specific instances-according to Schroeder to all cases which we
would call a nuisance. Criminal penalties never attached in these cases. Such a case
was, for instance, damage done to the neighbor's property by grazing cattle. Apparently in all nuisance cases, and perhaps in the whole tort law, no inquiry into the
frame of mind of the wrongdoer was had, but in all such cases strict tort liability
followed.
Brunner tells us more about the nature of the vapawerke. They were in their definitions qualified by certain extenuating factors which, if they occurred in that particular
manner, would entitle the culprit to a lesser punishment than would the-by its
definition-unqualified crime. The old Germans apparently did not judge the psychological attitude of the culprit from crime to crime, but they concerned themselves
with extenuating circumstances, i.e. "less wicked attitudes of the offender as shown
by the nature of his misdeed", 0 in a more general and certainly easier way. It must
be in this way that the treatment of psychological attitudes differed from our modern
case to case method. But it should be remembered, that our modern statute books are
full of "qualified" and "unqualified" crimes of otherwise the same substance, and that
these crimes-likewise by their definition-treat the offender more severely. The
modern law is merely on a level of higher rationality.
On the whole, Germanic law followed a very rigid formalism. As example for this
Brunner cites a provision of one of the old leges, where the seriousness of the delict
(a case of mutilation) was measured strictly by extrinsic circumstances: If the offender
would maim his adversary by cutting off a piece of bone of his body, "which, when
perjuravit, manuu suam redimet auctor sacramenti."
-1Op. cit. supra, p. 80.
" See BRun%F1R, op. cit. supra. p. 18.
*1"Qui nescius
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thrown at a buckle from a distance of twelf feet, would make this buckle sound,"
then the culprit had to respond in punitive damages. Does this really differ so much
from our modem law, where we likewise base the punishment on the degree of wickedness of the offender? As yardstick we too often use the amount of harm done, so that,
even today, extrinsic circumstances are determinative of the punishment. Some of
these instances are, of course, arrived at by taking into consideration the dangerousness of a particular activity or instrument used, so as to deter from acting in a particular manner. Others are solely aimed at punishing the specially wicked intent
which manifests itself in such activity, and this wicked intent is thought to be implicit in the act put under penalty. But in all these cases the outward circumstances
are determinative." The old Germans, for instance, inferred a wicked intent from the
fact that the (accidental or intentional) killer had hidden the body of the victim. This
causes even Schroeder to concede that the "typical state of evil intent was determinative for the concept of Meinwerke (wicked deeds)."'
With this von Amira concurs. He further explains that "evil deeds" (Meinwerke or
Neidingstaten) were: Certain homicides, thefts, rape, sometimes arson, and treason.
According to von Amira's sources, even recidivism was specially considered, whereas
"attempt" had no special treatment. 3
Eberhard Schmidt's conclusions deserve to be translated in full: "Criminal resultresponsibility (Erfolgshaftung) does not mean that Germanic legal thought disregarded the evil intent entirely. Germanic justice is entirely familiar with the idea
that harm done with intent and scienter weighs more heavily than a -mere act of
negligence. But whether the deed was accompanied by evil intent or not, was not
judged from the [particular] 'physical circumstances,'-for that German legal thought
then lacked all possibilities-but it was judged by [standard] extrinsic circumstances
of the deed, as is said now, in cases which are peculiar to and indicative of the evil
intent of a certain criminal type. Germanic legal thought had not been able to apprehend that such extrinsic circumstances quite frequently can be indicative of quite
different motives."94
Maitland and Pollock, though still tending to the view that absolute responsibility
was the rule rather than the exception, cite interesting instances of aggravated crimes
among the Anglo-Saxons, namely killing by poisoning, and witchcraft, both in their
nature aimed at evil intent. 9
2. ROMAN

LAW

Kunkel and Wolff write about the fragments of the XXII Tables, according to
which the inference is inescapable that, at least at that time, a distinction was made
between murder and manslaughter, for we read the following passage in the frag91E.g., Automobile traps, Geselz gegen Strassenraub mittels A tofallen, rem 22. Juni 1938
(R.G.BL.I, S. 651), as compared with "normal" robbery, §249 R.St.G.B. (German Penal Code).
In this category belong all cases of aggravating circumstances, but compare especially §224 B.St.G.B.
German Penal Code) with the old Germanic norm for mutilation, quoted above.

Ibid., p. 18.
93 VoN
4

AMIRA, op. cit. supra, p. 48.

SCHMIDr, op.

cit. supra, §17. His sections 27 et seq. are a commendable reading on this subject

matter.
9See

POLLOcK

AND 'MAITLAND,

op. cit. supra, p. 52.
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ments: "If a spear escaped the hand rather than that he threw it. . . "9s But the distinction between murder and manslaughter is thought to be much older. It is a code
provision, attributed to Numa Polpiluis: "If somebody kills a free man knowingly
and with evil intent, he shall be [regarded] a murderer [of a countryman]."
Rein, 18 as expected, gave these sources particular treatment. He is convinced from
all the sources available to him-over a centruy ago-that most primitive Roman law
already considered the frame of mind of the offender, though this was restricted to such
crimes as were considered as particularly dangerous to the security of the state, and
only with respect to the completed act. But the later so important distinction between
dolo and cadpa apparently was not so important in Rome's earliest days as it later
became."
Rein confirms about Roman law what Germanists found over 100 years later in
Germanic law, namely, that eventus was the only determinant for liability in tort law,
but that in penal law the frame of mind of the offender was of grave importance.
Mommsen's theory is more orthodox. He gets an impression of the Roman sources
which is contrary to Rein's. Mommsen thinks that earliest, unrecorded Roman law
was entirely unconcerned with the delinquent's psychological attitude and guilt.
However, important is one other observation of Mommsen's: The Romans never
regarded inanimate objects as being capable of the commission of a wrong. 100 This
observation, based on the absence of any mention of instances of object-responsibility, is quite indicative that primitive Romans had at least some vague conception of
the participation of the human mind in the commission of wrongs.
Knowledge of all these data, both of Germanic and of Roman origin, unenlightened
by present day knowledge of human behaviour, reasonably could lead one to different
conclusions as to this aspect of most primitive criminal law, i.e. Rein's view and
Mommsen's view. Both views are speculative to an extent. If Rein's view was the
better guess, it probably is not his merit. The prevailing view, however, seems to have
been Mommsen's, proof of which is the fact that Max Weber relied on it.
How correct Rein's view and how incorrect Mommsen's view are may not be
answered now, but may be postponed until we have consulted our ethnological
jurists.
3. LAWS

OF BA3YLONIA AND ANCIENT PERSIA
0

As previously mentioned' ' it has been thought that the adherence to principles of
strict liability is an indication of primitive legal thinking.',, That this is simply not
so has been -aid. Mosaic law provides that "ox and owner shall be stoned" when it
06"Si lelum niana fugit magis quam eiecit...." Table VIII, 24, a. See KuiNKLx, op. cit. supra,
WOLFF, Op. Cit. supra.

1 "Si quis honnem librzn dolo sciens inorli d it, paricidasesto."
Numa Pompilius, 2nd King
of Rome, 715-673. References to this passage are in the works of SERwVus, MARCALLUs, FESTUS,
DYoNislus, PLUTARcHUS, MACROBrIuS, Livius, HORATruS. See BRUNS, FONTEs IURIS ROMANI
.AXTIQUI, Tubingen, 1909, p. 10.
98Op. cit. supra, pp. 42 et seq.
" See Rnix, op. cit. supra. pp. 144 et seq.
,b[hid., p. 65.
1I,supra.
1).

5, supra.
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has been established that a vicious ox, the propensities of which are known to his
owner, had gored a man. 1°3 Possibly the sanction is based strictly on revenge, but it
is just as likely that this law is strictly utilitarian, i.e. to rid society of a vicious beast
-as far as the sanction against the beast is concerned--and to deter cattlemen from
keeping vicious beasts-as far as the punishment against the keeper is concerned.
The Babylonians provided for a case of this nature merely a tort remedy,410 (thereby
indicating the policy that the cause was not harmful enough to society as a whole to
justify penal sanction). Clearly, one can find no trace of revenge in this provision.
A very fine feeling for the nens rea is shown in the provisions about adultery and
bigamy in the Code of Hammurabi. The wife of a prisoner of war who commits adultery (bigamy?) when there is still sustenance in the family home, is guilty of the
crime. 0 5 But if there was no more sustenance in the home, she incurs no penalty. 10 6
Remarkable are also the provisions of secs. 192-193 of the Code of Hammurabi,
evidencing a deep concern with ethical considerations: The foster son who is ungrateful to his foster parents is to be punished by mutilation. This is a severe penalty, but
was considered appropriate for what was a grave crime among the ancient Babylonians: ingratitude. Section 153 of the Code of Hammurabi likewise shows a deep concern with the moral baseness of a wrongdoer. The law provided that a wife who
murdered her husband for the sake of another man should be punished with the most
severe penalty known to the Babylonians: impaling.
One of the best pieces of evidence in the Code of Hammurabi of concern with the
inens tea or inner motivations of a culprit is contained in secs. 206-207. ."If one man
strike another in a quarrel and wound him, he shall swear, 'I did not strike him intentionally' and he shall pay the physician." And: "If the man die of his wounds, he
shall likewise swear, and if he [the victim] be a free-born man, he shall pay one-half
mina of silver."
These provisions evidence two things:
(1) The frame of mind of the offender was inquired into in all cases of mayhem and
homicide. If it could be established that the intention to produce the result was lacking, the crime was not made out and only a tort action would lie."01
Like all primitive peoples the Babylonians did not have a good feeling of reliability
-trustwortbiness--of evidence. In this case an oath was considered sufficient evidence; but this is beside the point.
(2) The law is concerned with the duty of the wrongdoer toward the victim by providing that he shall pay the victim's doctor bill. The mere concern for the victim's
health as expressed in the code shows us how important ethical considerations were
to this primitive people.
On this second point we have a close parallel in Mosaic law. In Exodus 21:18 et
seq. we read that the tort feasor in personal injury cases "shall cause [the victim] to
be thoroughly healed." As I shall show in the next following section, such commands
are still the law among at least one primitive people of this century.
101 Ex. 21:28.
104One half mina of silver, sec. 251 C. H.
'0s Sec. 133.
IOGSec. 134.
I" See also sec. 227, absence of intent in deceit.

195.5j

TORT, CRIME AND THE PRIMITIVE

The common law justification of necessity, preventing culpability of what would
otherwise be a crime, can be traced back directly to Biblical times.0 8 From the first
chapter of Jonah we can infer that jettison of cargo was probably lawful, perhaps
even that the throwing-over-board of a human being to save other lives on distressed
ships was excusable. 09 And there is more than one provision in both the Old and the
New Testament indicating that necessity was a defense to the charge of theft among
the ancient Jews." 0
These instances indicate that as far back as we can trace the Babylonians and the
Jews in history, these peoples did not adhere to strict result-responsibility, but did
consider the frame of mind of the wrongdoer in establishing the culpability of a
harmful act.
4.

CONTEMPORARY PRIMIvE LAWS

Starting again with Inca law before the Spanish conquest, one of the more developed primitive systems: "He that kills another without authority or just cause,
condemns himself to death", so reads one of the sections of the Inca Pachacutee,
translated into modern English."' A legal system of such nature has a high regard
for the inner motivations of the offender.
Llewellyn and Hoebel report quite similar facts about our North American Cheyennes.1'2 The council had to determine whether a killing was murder or accident.
The authors summarize Cheyenne law of justifications excuses and mitigating circumstances in the case of homicide as follows: (The summary is in code form.)
Article 3, Exceptions and Mitigations
(a) A killing is justified:
(i) Where necessary in a self defense against the incestuous rape,
(ii) Where necessary to remove a homicidal recidivist, generally felt to be dangerous to the

people (?)
(iii) Where utterly and absolutely necessary to military police in the execution of an important duty. (?)
(l A killing is excused if (within the family, and ?) demonstrably accidental.
(c Provocation, drunkenness, seeming necessity for self defense, or other mitigating circumstances
are for consideration of the authorities in admeasuring, or later, in remitting banishment.
(d1 The authorities may adjudge the killing secularly excused or justified and yet take such measures as may seem to them desirable in pursuance to communal safety, in regard to possible
supernatural effects of a killing. Only in extraordinary cases are the arrows to be renewed.
(C) Volhntary withdrawal by a notable head chief who has killed under extenuating circumstances
may serve in lieu of banishment (?)113

The authors report that-as in Germanic laws-there are aggravated crimes from
which an especially evil intent could be inferred, i.e. theft at night time, but not in

day time, and crimes which endangered the well being of the community, e.g. thefts
"" JEROME
i TIALL, PRINC'IPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, Indianapolis, 1947, Cli. 12.
(-()mpare
o
Hindu law, Laws of Mann, sees. 349-351, in which killing in self defense or defense
,of women or macrcd lives, is declared to be justifiable homicide. 1 KoCoIoRFK AND WIGMORE, Op. cit.

,,upra, 1).40(1.
1 '.g.,

Matiew 12; Dent. 23:24, 25.
S'AN'KWICI,
%'
op. cit. supra, p. 19.
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I. i.W1.1 IAN"AN) I 1o1:111J., op. cit. supra, pp. 136 et seq., and pp. 165 ct seq.
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of horses, but not theft of other animals or chattels (at daytime). The aggravated
crimes carry higher penalties.
Let us go some steps lower on the scale of culture:
Schultz-Ewert and Adam, reporting about the already mentioned African peoples,
state their observations and inferences as follows: Among the Ruanda (East Africa),
criminal responsibility seems to extend to harm done by a stranger with weapons
which the owner had left unguarded, e.g. a spear left sticking in the ground."4 It is
most interesting to compare this case with Pollock and Maitland's findings about
Anglo-Saxon law under King Canute, and it is quite remarkable that the condemnation for the wrong done was in neither case directed against the inanimate spear,
but against the animate owner of the spear, who was thought to be somehow responsible for at least his absent-mindedness. Of course, another inference might be
that a "forgotten" weapon quite frequently could have been a "trap" to harm an
adversary, and that primitive society, not capable of efficient crime detection, inferred this evil intent from such standardized situations.
About the Uriundi we know that no penal consequences followed to harm caused
in established self defense, or if done by an obvious idiot. However, this dangerous
imbecile would be killed by society as a preventive measure."' Oddly enough, in this
tribe the authors find no absolute responsibility for harm done by unguarded weapons.
The consequence to manslaughter among the Uha was a mere compensation in
8
tort fashion, without any penal consequences."
Among the Wassaugu a remarkable law is reported to exist. In case of.mayhem the
defendant was convicted to nurse the victim until he recovered."' This is an amazing
consideration of the psychological attitude of the defendant for the purpose of resocialization. This penalty is directed against the soul of the defendant, which becomes even more apparent by the fact that the defendant's life was forfeited not only
when the victim died, for then the case of murder was completed, and capital punishment attached, but also when the defendant prevented the victim's recovery through
lax care on the sick-bed.
The Mbago are reported to punish embezzlement much stronger than ordinary
theft," 8 as quite frequently crimes involving a breach of trust are punished more
severely than other crimes.
The peoples of Togo do not punish (in behalf of the state) the juvenile delinquent.
In Buem the idiot is reported to be immune from prosecution; in Kunja, character
defamation, a crime of serious nature, leads to a mere reprimand if committed while
intoxicated." 9 Among the Bergdama, Nama, and Namib-Bushmen the unintentional wrong also remains unprosecuted, and intoxication and low mentality entitle
the offender to "mitigating circumstances", i.e. little or no punishment.
According to the authors, most of the peoples of the investigated Pacific islands
"I Op. cit. supra,
11-Ibid., p. 291.

p. 259.

116Ibid., p. 296.

" Ibid.: p. 296.

118Ibid., p. 320.
"9

Ibid., pp. 527, 643, 709.
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are on a lower stage of culture than the investigated African peoples. Though on
Nauru and Ponape only intentional wrongs are dealt with by society, on Truk no
consideration of mitigating circumstances is had, which does not exclude that some
wrongs-by definition-embody what is thought by these peoples to be
"wicked".no
But on Jap and Nauru we find marked distinctions between crimes committed
with malice aforethought and intent, and mere negligence cases, intoxication and
2
self-defense.' '
The writers summarize about the Papua Melanesians: "It would be error to assume that the Papua Melanesians made no distinctions between accident and intentional wrong", but they make it clear that modern distinctions, which are so
extensively based on our superior knowledge in both crime detection and determining
of judgment and sentence, should not be used as a measure.
Last not least we have Thurnwald's observations: "It would be erroneous to believe that primitive peoples do not have a strong feeling for right and wrong, only
the affect-accentuations are distributed in a different manner." Thurnwald urges us
22
to forget our modem conceptions in judging the laws of these primitive peoples.'
He finds much evidence to the effect that-in irrational fashion-external circumstances are taken as proof of a wicked motive and that in many cases absolute responsibility for the harm done attaches. But his studies show also that it would be
farfetched to say that these most primitive peoples are not aware of the distinction
between intentional wrong and mere negligence or accident. Nor would it be accurate to say that they are not trying their best to determine all these facts in given
cases in their own way with these distinctions in mind. 12 That primitive people do
not have the ability to do a "better job" in considering psychological attitudes may
not be taken as evidence of an utter disregard of mind and soul in their criminal
justice. Thurnwald always reminds us that it is good to remember our own weaknesses, not only in medieval criminal law, but even today in our codes and courtrooms.
We may conclude with this statement: Even most primitive law does concern itself
with the inner motivations and psychological attitudes of the culprit.
SUMMhAZED CONCLUSION
1. Primitive law makes definite distinctions between crime and tort.
2. In primitive criminal law society is concerned with the inner motivations and
psychological attitudes of the culprit.
3. In primitive tort law society apparently shows little concern for the motives of
the wrong-doer, approaching our modem concept of absolute liability.
These conclusions are contrary to those of Max Weber, his contemporaries and
most of the scholars that wrote in the 19th century. We must not forget that those
scholars were limited in their observations and conclusions to the materials and knowl20

Ibid., p. 528.
121Ibid., p. 531.
m THUmWAmD, op. cit. supra, p. 15.
12

Ibid., see esp. pp. 25 et seq.
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edge available at their time. Today we have a vastly larger resource of evidence,
we have a better understanding of human behaviour. It is obvious that our conclusions should differ. How close we are to the ultimate truth about the law of primitive society cannot be judged. It is only to be hoped that the human mind will never
tire of searching for the springs of the giant stream law, for "the history of what
2
the law has been is necessary to the knowledge of what the law is.,,' 4

m OuvER WENDELL HOLmES, THE COmmON LAw, Boston,

1949, p. 37.

